THINGS TO THINK ABOUT

Some of the following is repeat material that is shed in a different light.
It is hoped by doing it this way it will help the reader find his or her nitch in understanding the whole scope of Lee’s website materials at www.the-law.biz and Road Warrior Radio Program on the Republic Broadcasting Network.

The 14th Amendment (1868) reads in part:
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. (Bold emphasis added)
The 14th amendment is an executive order (proclamation) Vol. 1 of Presidential Executive Orders, 2 vols. (N.Y.: Books, Inc., 1944—Copyright by Mayor of N.Y. 1944).
“[T]he term 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof ‘ . . . must be construed in the sense in which the term is used in international law as accepted in the United States as well as Europe. * * * The provision of the 14th Amendment alluded to . . . is affirmative and declaratory, intended to allay doubts and to settle controversies which had arisen with respect to citizenship.” Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws or Private International Law, 3rd ed. (Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1906), vol. 1, pp. 45-47.

Private International Law Defined and Distinguished. "International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has be in appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually
called private international law or the conflict of law's, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominion, of another nation-is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the Courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113. 16 S. C. Rep,. 139.  Taken from LEADING CASES ON PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL LAW.  By John W. Dwyer, LL.M.

The 14th Amendment paved the way for the nation to have a money system based upon a commercial paper society by giving those who deal in commercial paper a privilege of discharging their debts under private international law outside the realm of the common law where the rule of law is “payment” of debt.

The 16th Amendment  [1913] to wit:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.¹

When a person receives a commercial instrument and signs that instrument without any declaration as to the terms and conditions of the signature, it is considered income because you have by your silence accepted a “discharge” of a debt. That discharge is considered a quasi corporate privilege of limited liability in the discharge of debt therefore taxable. In another words, there is a silent agreement that HJR 192² (attached at end of document), is a certifiable law despite the fact that there is no enacting clause that states. “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, and it is hereby enacted and declared, .   .   .”   
As noted in Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, there is no charter of incorporation by HJR 192 of the newly created several federal states and just what its duties are, i.e., its intents and purposes; instead there is a resulting or implied (charitable) trust is formed by operation of law.  In other words, Congress created the conditions for a resulting or implied trust with HJR 192. ³  See federal statute remedy at end of document at footnote #6.

There is a distinction between a “debt discharged” and a “debt paid.”  When discharged the debt still exists though divested of its character as a legal obligation during the operation of the discharge.  Something of the original vitality of the debt continues to exist which may be transferred, even though the transferee takes it subject to its disability incident to the discharge.  The fact that it carries something which may be a consideration for a new promise to pay, so as to make an otherwise worthless promise a legal obligation, makes it the subject of transfer by assignment.  Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784.

Thus it is read, in Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982). Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has defined “gross income” as income “from whatever source derived.” Including “[I]ncome from discharge of indebtedness.” [HJR 192]; 26 U.S.C. 61 (12). This Court has recognized that “income” may be realized by a variety of indirect means. Still quoting from Diedrich, In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, (1929), the Court held that payment of an employee’s income taxes by an employer constituted income to the employee. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Taft concluded that, “[t]he payment of the tax by the employe[r] was in consideration of the services rendered by the employee and was a gain derived by the employee from his labor.” Id., at 729. The Court made clear that the substance, not the form, of the agreed transaction controls. “The discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.” [bold underline emphasis added].

When a gift is made, the gift tax liability falls on the donor under 26 U.S.C. 2502(d). When a donor makes a gift to a donee, a “debt” to the United States for the amount of the gift tax is incurred by the donor. “Although intent is relevant in determining whether a gift has been made, subjective intent has not characteristically been a factor in determining whether an individual has realized income.” [Underline, italics emphasis added]  End of Diedrich.

Lets analyze the clause
“Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has defined “gross income” as income “from whatever source derived.” Including “[I]ncome from discharge of indebtedness.” [HJR 192]; 26 U.S.C. 61 (12). This Court has recognized that “income” may be realized by a variety of indirect means.⁴ Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, (1929).
If a person receives a check and that person signs that check, without any terms or conditions other than your signature, that check becomes evidence that you agreed to “discharge” the debt pursuant to HJR 192. “The Court made clear that the substance, not the form, of the agreed transaction controls.” A check signed without any terms or conditions is taxable. A check signed with terms and conditions is a contract that is non taxable. Remember, everything dealing with commercial instruments is governed by contract law. Take notice of the word “assumption” at footnote 5 at § 163. Assumption of Secured Indebtedness.
Now let us address the issue of what you do with the check after you sign it with terms and conditions. In such a case deposit it in a debit account.
Otherwise, if the check contains no terms or conditions it becomes subject primarily to HJR 192; secondarily to Title 15 USC Chap. 41 Sec 1602 c, d, e. In other words, you have accepted a privilege for limited liability in the discharge of debt. A signed check with no terms and conditions can also be considered a gift whereby you have to fill out the forms and pay the tax under Title 26 U.S.C. 2502(d).  In other words, a check with no terms and conditions becomes a grab bag as to what the government wants to do with it when it comes to taxing those commercial instruments.                                        
“The tax under consideration is a tax on bank circulation, and may very well be classed under the head of duties.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno 75 U.S. 547 (1869)” [One year after the 14th amendment became law] [underline emphasis added]
“Congress may restrain, by suitable enactment’s, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own authority. Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile.” Id. 533, 549. [underline emphasis added]
Everyone soon found that it was a lot easier simply to use the deposit receipts directly as a means of payment. These receipts, which became known as notes, were acceptable as money since whoever held them could go to the banker and exchange them for metallic money.
Then, bankers discovered that they could make loans merely by giving their promises to pay, or bank notes, to borrowers. In this way, banks began to create money. More notes could be issued than the gold and coin on hand because only a portion of the notes outstanding would be presented for payment at any one time. Enough metallic money had to be kept on hand, of course, to redeem whatever volume of notes was presented for payment. Transaction deposits are the modern counterpart of bank notes. It was a small step from printing notes to making book entries crediting deposits of borrowers, which the borrowers in turn could "spend" by writing checks, thereby “printing” their own money. From Modern Money Mechanics, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, p. 3 last column February 2001. [Bold emphasis added].
“But in the case before us the object of taxation is not the franchise of the bank, but property created, or contracts made and issued under the [privilege], or power to issue bank bills.  . . . it will hardly be questioned that contracts of [debt/credit] are objects of taxation within the powers of Congress.  And it seems difficult to distinguish the taxation of notes issued for circulation from the taxation of these [debt/credit] contracts. Both descriptions of contracts are means of profit to the [individual] which issue them; and both, as we think, may properly be made contributory to the public revenue.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno 75 U.S 533, 549. (1869). [underline emphasis added]
If you think printing your own money isn’t limited liability in discharge of debt a privilege outside the 16th amendment, think again. Remember, we are dealing with your right to contract. See Title 15 USC Chap. 41 Sec.1602 (c, (d), (e), Title 12 USC 95a.
Chancellor Kent observes, that Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, Vol. 3 p. 19, . . .  the prohibition (of bills of credit) does not extend to bills emitted by individuals, singly or collectively, whether associated under a private agreement for banking purposes, as was the case with the Bank of New York, prior to its earliest charter, which was in the winter of 1791, or acting under a charter of incorporation. Veazie Bank v. Fenno 75 U.S. 553, 554.  [Underline emphasis added] [See also The Bank of United States v. Planters Bank 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (22 U.S. 904).; Title 15 USC Chap. 41 Sec.1602 (c, (d), (e), Title 12 USC 95a.]
“It will be observed, the tax  . . .  upon the bills in circulation is not a tax on the property of the institutions. The bills in circulation are not the property, but the debts of the [unincorporated side of the bank, and, in their account of debits and credits, are placed to the debit [and credit] side. Certainly, no government has yet made the discovery of taxing both sides of this account, debit and credit, as the property of a taxable person or corporation. If both these items could be made available for this purpose, a heavy National debt need not create any very great alarm.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno 75 U.S. 554, 555.   This is why there has always been a heavy national debt since the 1940’s.  The government taxes both sides of your debt/credit account.  See Title 15 USC Sec 1602 c, d, e.  It must be noted there was no private foreign banking interest in 1869 as third party with our public money for private debt.
Every federal power must be express, or implied from some power or group of powers; and any attempted exercise of power not delegated violates the Tenth Amendment.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326.
The power to issue bills and “regulate values” of coin cannot be so enlarged as to authorize arbitrary action, whose immediate purpose and necessary effect is destruction of individual rights, as this Court has said, a “power to regulate is not a power to destroy.”  Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 398.  The 5th Amendment limits all governmental powers. Perry v. United States 294 U.S. 373 (1933).
“The Constitution's division of power among the three Branches is violated where one Branch invades the territory of another”, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, (1992).  [The court has no power to accomplish a political act.]

§ 20. Copartnerships and joint adventures.
At common law the distinction between the corporation and the partnership as a type of business organization was very marked. In point of fact, one of the reasons for the rapid development in the use of corporations was the inadequacy of the partnership to serve many of the needs of business and commerce. In the absence of statutory\modification or of special agreement between the associates, the following are the chief respects in which the partnership differs from the corporation:
A partnership is created by mere agreement between the partners. The approval of the state is not necessary. On the other hand, in order to form a corporation something more is needed than the mere agreement of the incorporators. It is necessary to obtain special authority from the state in order to incorporate. Without the consent and sanction of the sovereign state so obtained, the incorporators cannot be treated by the law as legal persons. In any event, a corporation cannot be compared in all matters to a principal acting through his agent or a partner acting through his copartner, because a corporation is a fictional being, a creation of law, with neither will, purpose nor animation. It can act only through its agents. A copartnership, unlike a corporation, does not have the attribute of succession; a change of name and personnel does not affect the identity of a corporation, and there are other differences. The Supreme Court of Illinois has aptly said: "A corporation cannot be constituted by agreement of parties. It can only be created by or under legislative enactment." .However, the fact that legislative authorization has been obtained for the creation of an association does not necessarily indicate that the association is a corporation, since joint stock companies, "partnership associations" and similar unincorporated associations are frequently authorized by state authority.  Thus, corporations becoming partners under provisions of law permitting it do not thereby form a corporation,' and a private bank  organized as a partnership is not converted into a corporation by virtue of the provisions of a statute regulating and supervising "the business of banking by individuals, partnerships or unincorporated persons." So individuals may enter into partnership agreements or joint ventures independent of the corporate form, but they may not organize a corporation for the purpose of carrying on a joint venture.
Taken from FLETCHER , CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATION'S
Originally Authored by William Mead Fletcher 1983 REVISED VOLUME
By Cynthia Van Swearingen, J.D. of the Publisher. Editorial Staff  VOL.  I
Cite as : Fletcher Cyc Corp § (Perm Ed) Callaghan CALLAGHAN & COMPANY 18201 Old Glenview Road/Wilmette, Illinois 60091
§ 20 FLETCHER CYC CORP Ch. 1
As the Court noted in The Propeller Genesee Chief:  The law … contains no regulations of commerce. … It merely confers a new jurisdiction on the district courts; and this is its only object and purpose. … It is evident…that Congress, in passing [the law], did not intend to exercise their power to regulate commerce. … The statutes do no more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases.12 How. at 451-452 [Bold emphasis added]. Verlinden v. Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 496 (1983).

Jurisdiction of the court extends by the letter of the U.S. Constitution. Those who would withdraw any case from that description must sustain the exemption they claim on the spirit and true meaning of the Constitution, and that spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to override the words which the framers have employed. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). [Bold emphasis added]. 
[The above case was rendered under Article III when the nation had public money for private debt. In other words, the letter and strict meaning of the constitution was the public mandate in 1821. The spirit and true meaning of the constitution became the public mandate with HJR 192 that gave the nation private money for public debt. The result was Erie RR v. Tompkins 304 US 64 in 1938 that set aside Swift v. Tyson 16 Peters 1 (1842.) Erie RR reinforced HJR 192 by creating diversity of citizenship; not in Article III courts but the legislative courts of Article I in conjunction with the 11th  and 14th Amendments; Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. . In the May 1984 issue of Harvard Law Review, Vol. 97 No. 7 noted: that whether Erie RR v. Tompkins supra, or Swift v Tyson supra, is to apply is a contractual right up to the individual. In other words, a person uses case law that pertains to the incorporated states of the Union as his or her law. Most of that law is old law.
When an action is filed in the federal district court using a statute, here is what one is confronted with.
In relation to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Article III Section 2.1, known as the case “arising under” clause. The words “arising under … laws of the United States” have chiefly been construed in cases involving not Article III directly, but the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction in  28 U.S.C. § 1331 and its predecessors, which is cast in the same language.  It is universally acknowledged, however, that the statutory grant does not exhaust the constitutional power. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969); see National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 613-14 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Mishkin supra, at 160-63; Note on the effect of the Statutory Adoption of the Constitutional Language, Hart & Wechsler, at 870; Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3562 (1975).

As noted in 76 L Ed 2d 831 in reference to Verlinden v Bank of Nigeria 461 U.S. 480, concerning Article III Section 2 Clause 1, and “arising under”.  “However, it should be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by the constitutional ‘arising under’ clause is broader than the federal question jurisdiction provided by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §1331, even though the language of the statute is almost identical to that of the constitutional clause. The reason given for this distinction is that there exists policy consideration [i.e., an unincorporated association under Erie RR] underlying the purpose of the jurisdictional statute that limit its application and which do not enter into the picture when construing the constitutional authorization for statutory federal question jurisdiction.”
As noted in Verlinden v. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 460.  “It’s a statute, not a Constitution we are expounding”, thus caution must be taken that the cases being relied upon to answer jurisdictional questions are not discussing statutory jurisdiction or vice versa.
[Bold emphasis added].  In other words, in a 28 USC 1331 action, Congress stands between you and the constitution. In order to circumvent Congress’ intervention you must produce evidence⁵ to prove that you are entitled to a true Article III ( j)udical (P)ower court and that is accomplished with a Title 5 FOIA action. Otherwise, the court will treat your petition as a Article I petition under (J)udical (p)ower under the 11th and the 14th Amendment and Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, and the commerce clause of Article I Sec. 8. The court will reject your petition as failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, failure to exhaust all your administrative remedies. FOIA requests are designed to determine what can and cannot be used for evidence in a court action. ©
(Copyrighted material)

Tom Jefferson stated that a majority is one man with courage.

Please take note that the following RESOLUTION has no enacting clause that states:
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, and it is hereby enacted and declared, .   .   .”   
192  73  Cong., 1st session (48 STAT 113) June 5, 1933 to wit:
Joint resolution to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States.
Whereas the holding of or dealing in gold affect the public interest, and are therefore subject to proper regulation and restriction; and
Whereas the existing emergency has disclosed that provisions of obligations which purport to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency of the United States, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, obstruct the power of the Congress to regulate the value of the money of the United States, and are inconsistent with the declared policy of the Congress to maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar, coined or issued by the United States, in the markets and in the payment of debts. Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not such provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts. Any such provision contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States is hereby repealed, but the repeal of any such provision shall not invalidate any other provision or authority contained in such law.
(b) As used in this resolution, the term “obligation” means an obligation (including every obligation of and to the United States, excepting currency) payable on money of the United States; and the term “coin or currency” means coin or currency of the United States, including Federal Reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking associations.
 Sec. 2. The last sentence of paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of section 43 of the Act entitled “An Act to relieve the existing national economic emergency by increasing agriculture purchasing power, to raise revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of such emergency, to provide emergency relief with respect to agriculture indebtedness, to provide for the orderly liquidation of joint-stock land banks, and for other purposes.” approved May 12, 1933, is amended to read as follows:
“All coins and currencies of the United States (including Federal Reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking associations) heretofore or hereafter coined or issued, shall be legal tender for all debts, public and private, public charges, taxes, duties, and dues, except that gold coins, when below the standard weight and limit of tolerance provided by law for the single piece, shall be legal tender only at valuation in proportion of their actual weight.”

Approved, June 5, 1933, 4.40 p.m. [Codified at 31 USC 5118 2d]

Lee Brobst
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